Tampilkan postingan dengan label Monetary Economics. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Monetary Economics. Tampilkan semua postingan

Of Course Monetary Policy is an Asset Swap -- But that Doesn't Make it Any Less Useful


Nobel Laureate Eugene Fama created waves within the past few days once he referred to as QE a "neutral event". Fama argued that as a result of QE was simply the exchange of 1 quite interest bearing quality (money that collects IOER) for one more (long term treasuries and agency MBS), the policy might don't have any result. In my view, his comments were mistaken as a result of they targeted on economics intuition and so neglected the economic science effects of financial policy.

Fama's main argument was that financial policy modified character at the zero bound. beginning in 2008, the Fed started paying interest on excess reserves. Once the Fed began to pay IOER, excess reserves command by banks became interest bearing assets. As a result, currently once the Fed conducts QE, all it's extremely doing is taking the non-public sector's future bonds and assets and exchanging them for brief term (interest bearing) money. therefore no new currency makes it into the economy, and per se QE will don't have any result.

The started is correct, however not the conclusion. By ignoring the role of expectations at the zero bound, Fama glosses over the $64000 reason why QE matters. Scott sociologist explained this a number of weeks ago:
So QE works for terribly easy reasons. Permanent financial injections square measure effective even at the zero sure. QE programs square measure a symptom that central banks would favor a minimum of slightly quicker nominal gross domestic product growth. Slightly quicker nominal gross domestic product growth needs that a minimum of alittle portion of the currency injection be permanent. therefore by sign a preference for slightly quicker nominal gross domestic product growth, central banks square measure implicitly sign a preference to own a minimum of alittle portion of the QE program be permanent (for any given IOR rate). Markets believe the central banks (and why shouldn’t they?) And therefore quality costs react to the QE program.
In short, QE is effective as a result of it changes expectations concerning the long run financial base. Since QE signals a rise within the financial base during this amount and every one future periods, it raises expectations concerning future nominal financial gain and thus boosts the economy currently. Since the short term rate won't be below the interest paid on reserves forever, then the injection of currency includes a positive result on the long run price index. this is often not a story of wealth effects from appreciating money assets or a reach for yield as a result of lower average bond period. it is not a story of individuals borrowing because the results of lower interest rates. It's simply an easy tale of worth expectations and forward trying financial policy.

Another peculiar argument Fama created was that the Fed's current policy ought to really be raising short term interest rates. as a result of the Fed is introducing a lot of short term debt (in the shape of cash) on the market, then short term rates ought to rise. Analogously, as a result of the Fed is shopping for up most future debt, then the future rates ought to fall.

But this misses the underlying macro context. as a result of the acquisition of assets represents a symptom a couple of desired financial outcome, the results of this "asset swap" isn't as neutral as Fama would believe. Moreover, as a result of the Fed has created a commitment to keeping the Fed Funds rate low for Associate in Nursing extended amount of your time, the short rate won't rise. Instead, by increasing the cash provide, the Fed keeps short rate low.

Now, if I were one market participant, true would show a discrepancy. If I singly determined to sell short term debt to shop for future debt, then with sufficiently massive quantities I might raise the short term rate and lower the future rate. however since the Fed controls the printing presses and has the facility to pin down the short term rate, this logic doesn't apply. Instead, if rates did rise, the Fed might simply purchase a lot of T-Bills. even supposing QE introduces a lot of short term assets into the system, it doesn't raise the short finish of the yield curve.

Furthermore, Fed's purchases of future treasuries square measure presupposed to raise long rates, not lower them. Since the the future rate goes up with higher NGDP expectations, then Fed purchases of future bonds ought to raise future rates. And as Michael Darda has repeatedly shown, rates rose throughout each amount of QE. {this is|this is often|this will be} simply another example of however economics intuition can fail catastrophically within the world of macro. as a result of Fed purchases have macro level effects on inflation and economic process, the Fed will really purchase a lot of of Associate in Nursing quality and have the worth of it go down.

Source: FRED, MKM Partners

If all this appears counter-intuitive, don't blame yourself. Instead, the blame ought to attend our obsession with interest rates in models of financial policy. as a result of financial policy has traditionally been enforced through changes within the Fed Funds rate, folks have equated financial policy with rate of interest policy. however indeed, interest rates ought to be seen as reflections of the cash provide. thus once we say that the Fed is curtailing term rates, what we actually mean is that the Fed is increasing the cash provide, and as a result, short term rates ar falling.

Thinking in these terms can check that you do not chuck the political economy aspect of financial policy. If Fama had same, "IOER suggests that the Fed's printing of cash to shop for long run bonds has no result on long run rates and really raises short term rates", it'd are forthwith clear one thing was off. Why would printing cash have a control on short term rates on condition that new mass of cash are often accustomed get T-Bills? cash forthwith evokes macro intuition, whereas interest rates concentrate on small intuition. As such, that specialize in cash permits you to protect against straightforward mistakes.

Thinking in terms of cash additionally makes positive you do not combine relation. Ronald McKinnon argued in a very recent WSJ opinion piece that the Fed ought to raise interest rates can stimulate banks to begin disposition. If you translate his statement regarding interest rates into cash, it'd scan "contract the cash provide thus banks begin lending". the primary statement appeals to economics, and appears wise. however even alittle considered the second statement in terms of cash forthwith reveals the error. To stimulate disposition, rates can ought to fall because the pecuniary resource expands. however over time, once interest rates rise, it'll be as a result of the financial growth boosting inflation.

Monetary theory is peculiar as a result of it contradicts plenty of basic economics and intuitions. As such, you frequently see terribly sensible folks (Nobel prize winners included) create smart-sounding arguments that ar ultimately false. thus for the maximum amount as I respect the work prof Fama has wiped out the sector of empirical finance, I ail his description of QE. it is not some neutral event, and to think so distracts from the urgent task of monetary reform.

Low Interest Rates, Savers, and the Recovery


This is a brief addendum to my recent post, "Do Savers Need to be Saved?"

Back in March, I wrote about Paul Krugman and Charles Plosser's takes on near-zero nominal interest rates and household saving. Both noted that households were deleveraging and the zero lower bound was binding. Both agreed about Krugman's diagnosis of a "persistent shortfall in aggregate demand that can’t be cured using ordinary monetary policy." But their suggested cures were quite different.

I just came across a piece written in May by Raghuram Rajan, new Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, called "Central Bankers under Siege," that takes on the same issue. He, too, makes a similar diagnosis but suggests different cures. In my post on savers and low interest rates, I discussed the income and substitution effects of low interest rates, and mentioned that near-retirees are commonly cited as examples of people for whom the income effect dominates. Rajan actually uses this exact example:
"First, while low rates might encourage spending if credit were easy, it is not at all clear that traditional savers today would go out and spend. Think of the soon-to-retire office worker. She saved because she wanted enough money to retire. Given the terrible returns on savings since 2007, the prospect of continuing low interest rates might make her put even more money aside. 
Alternatively, low interest rates could push her (or her pension fund) to buy risky long-maturity bonds. Given that these bonds are already aggressively priced, such a move might thus set her up for a fall when interest rates eventually rise. Indeed, America may well be in the process of adding a pension crisis to the unemployment problem."
Rajan and Plosser match up point for point. Here's Plosser:
"In fact, low interest rates and fiscal stimulus spending that leads to larger government budget deficits may be designed to stimulate aggregate demand or consumption, but they could actually do the opposite. For example, low interest rates encourage households to save even more because the return on their savings is very small...
I have heard from various business contacts that the low interest rate environment is spurring institutional and individual investors to “search for yield.” This may entail taking on more credit risk than these investors are typically comfortable with in a reach for yields that may ultimately be illusive and result in losses they are ill-equipped to handle. Very low yields may also be distorting other investment decisions, inducing firms to undertake long-run investment projects that may prove to be unprofitable in a rising interest rate environment."
Both Rajan and Plosser fear that lower interest rates won't help the economy because either the income effect dominates the substitution effect or because low interest rates will cause "reaching for yield." My fellow Not Quite Noahpinion author John Aziz suggests:
"Savers looking for a larger rate of return should... take their money out of low interest savings accounts and out of the failed financial intermediation industry and invest it into quality economic projects that create jobs and growth. This could involve buying the stock or debt of large companies that wish to expand, or it could involve starting your own business, or investing in a startup or a mixture of these things. The easiest way to return to growth — and thus higher interest rates, and higher returns for things like pension funds — is for today’s savers complaining about low interest rates to turn into tomorrow’s investors seeking out and pouring money into quality projects that increase incomes, create jobs and create products that people desire and want to use."
The question is whether low interest rates have the beneficial effect on investment that Aziz describes, or the harmful reach-for-yield effect. Returning to Plosser, Krugman, and Rajan, it is interesting that the three economists seem to diagnose what is ailing the economy quite similarly (a "persistent shortfall in aggregate demand that can’t be cured using ordinary monetary policy"), but make different prescriptions. First, they differ in their opinions of unconventional monetary policy:
  • Plosser: "The first step is to wind down our asset purchases by the end of the year in a gradual and predictable manner. As I said, I see little if any benefit from these purchases, and growing costs. The second step is for the FOMC to commit to its forward guidance on the fed funds rate path, that is, to begin treating the 6.5 percent unemployment rate and the 2.5 percent inflation rate in the guidance as triggers rather than thresholds."
  • Krugman: "Unconventional monetary policy is both controversial and an iffy proposition (which doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be tried)."
  • Rajan: "We really don’t know. Given the dubious benefits of still lower real interest rates, placing central-bank credibility at risk would be irresponsible."
They also differ in their general policy prescriptions:
  • Plosser wants removal of fiscal-policy-induced uncertainty: "There remains significant uncertainty about the choices that will be made. How much will tax rates rise? How much will government spending be cut? U.S. fiscal policy is clearly on an unsustainable path that must be corrected. Efforts by Congress and the administration at the end of last year reduced some of the near-term uncertainty over personal tax rates. But the impact of the sequester, the debate over the continuing resolution to fund the federal government beyond this month, and the debt ceiling, which will once again become binding in the spring, all have clouded the fiscal policy situation. So, the resultant uncertainty will likely be a drag on near-term growth. In my view, until uncertainty has been resolved, monetary policy accommodation that lowers interest rates is unlikely to stimulate firms to hire and invest."
  • Krugman thinks the fiscal multiplier is large, and fiscal retrenchment would be destructive: "the logic for a biggish multiplier and the logic of the crisis itself are very closely linked: times like these, the aftermath of a credit bubble, are precisely when you expect fiscal multipliers to be large. And that in turn says, once again, that fatalism — or worse yet, demands for fiscal retrenchment — in the aftermath of such a bubble are deeply destructive."
  • Rajan looks to helping households refinance, and (somehow) improving workforce capabilities: "We cannot ignore high unemployment. Clearly, improving indebted households’ ability to refinance at low current interest rates could help to reduce their debt burden, as would writing off some mortgage debt in cases where falling house prices have left borrowers deep underwater (that is, the outstanding mortgage exceeds the house’s value)... But it is also important to recognize that the path to a sustainable recovery does not lie in restoring irresponsible and unaffordable pre-crisis spending, which had the collateral effect of creating unsustainable jobs in construction and finance... Sensible policy lies in improving the capabilities of the workforce across the country, so that they can get sustainable jobs with steady incomes."

Four Ways to Answer Economics Questions


I recently came across a saying about the four ways of answering questions according to the Pañha Sutta.
  1. There are questions that should be answered categorically [straightforwardly yes, no, this, that].
  2. There are questions that should be answered with an analytical answer, defining or redefining the terms. 
  3. There are questions that should be answered with a counter-question. 
  4. There are questions that should be put aside.
A lot of the questions that economists get asked a lot can be answered in all four ways. I thought it would be fun to play a little "Economics Q&4A." I'll provide a few examples. If you wish, chime in with your own Q&4As in the comments.

Q: Is economics a science?
  1. Yes.
  2. This depends on exactly how you define science and what you consider to be the bounds and scope of economics. For the most part, economists cannot do controlled laboratory experiments. You can see lots of people's opinions on this question here, and you can read Mark Thoma and Paul Krugman here.
  3. Does this really matter? If it were not a science, should we stop trying to do it?
  4. **goes back to work**
Q: Is all this quantitative easing going to cause an inflation problem?
  1. No.
  2. You are probably asking about the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies. For an explanation of why they haven't (and probably won't) cause problematically high inflation, see these posts.
  3. What do you mean by inflation problem? Isn't it possible that a bit more inflation would be a good thing? Do you see any signs of an inflation problem? Don't we have bigger problems than inflation?
  4. **sighs**
Q: If households have to tighten their belts, shouldn't the government?
  1. No.
  2. By belt-tightening, I presume you mean reducing the deficit of the federal government. You might have heard President Obama say, in 2010, "Small businesses and families are tightening their belts. Their government should too." But households are different than the government. You can read some bloggers' reactions here and here.
  3. Is the government a household?
  4. **slumps**
Q: How should I invest my money?
  1. Wisely.
  2. This depends on your situation and your financial goals. I don't know of any guaranteed get-rich-quick investment schemes. You should probably try to diversify, and not keep all your money under your mattress or in gold. I'm also not an investment adviser, just a young academic economist with no experience, so I'm horribly underqualified to help you with this.
  3. How much money do you have? And what are your investment goals? And why are you asking an economics grad student?
  4. **shrugs wildly**
Q: Should we go back on the gold standard?
  1. No.
  2. Here is an excerpt from Barry Eichengreen's answer
"Envisioning a statute requiring the Federal Reserve to redeem its notes for fixed amounts of specie is easy, but deciding what that fixed amount should be is hard. Set the price too high and there will be large amounts of gold-backed currency chasing limited supplies of goods and services. The new gold standard will then become an engine of precisely the inflation that its proponents abhor. But set the price too low, and the result will be deflation, which is not exactly a healthy state for an economy...The distributional effects of deflation are no happier than those of inflation.... The populist revolt of the 1880s was stoked by farmers with fixed mortgages who labored under growing debt burdens and financial distress as a result of falling crop prices. Nor is deflation likely to support robust economic growth, as any close observer of the Japanese economy will tell you.... 
And even if we are lucky enough to get it right at the outset, consider what happens subsequently. As the economy grows, the price level will have to fall. The same amount of gold-backed currency has to support a growing volume of transactions, something it can do only if the prices are lower, unless the supply of new gold by the mining industry magically rises at the same rate as the output of other goods and services. If not, prices go down, and real interest rates become higher. Investment becomes more expensive, rendering job creation more difficult all over again. Under a true gold standard, moreover, the Fed would have little ability to act as a lender of last resort to the banking and financial system...Its proponents paint the gold standard as a guarantee of financial stability; in practice, it would be precisely the opposite." 
3. What have you learned from history?
4. **cowers**

Q: When is Noah coming back?
  1. In about 3 months.
  2. If you mean coming back to the blog, that will be in about 3 months. However, he has never left Twitter. If you mean coming back to the United States, I think that already happened. 
  3. What, don't you like us?
  4. **checks watch**
Your turn!
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