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The Beggar Maid: Economics and Alice Munro

I can't enable our Nobel-fest to come back to a detailed while not a post regarding Alice writer. The Canadian recipient of the laurels in Literature is in some ways in which an ideal complement to the Fama-Hansen-Shiller trio.

The word political economy has its origins within the Greek okionomia, or management of house affairs. Munro's short stories area unit typically categorised as domestic-- that equally suggests that of or associated with the running of a home. Her writing is economic in several senses of the word, in each vogue and theme. Poverty, desire, stinginess, and self-determination area unit among the themes she treats with the foremost ability and significance.

These themes emerge most notably, perhaps, in "The Beggar Maid," revealed in 1977, that tells the story of Rose, a university student on scholarship. The title alludes to "King Cophetua and also the Beggar Maid," associate degree 1884 painting by Edward Burne-Jones, supported associate degree earlier Elizabethan ballad and a literary composition by Lord Tennyson. King Cophetua, as you would possibly guess, falls soft on with a beggar maid-- or maybe with the thought of the beggar maid and also the stunning simplicity her economic condition represents to him. Munro's story contrasts the romanticisation of economic condition with the particular expertise of economic condition.

The story begins, "Patrick Blatchford was soft on with Rose." The sentence construction-- with Rose within the passive position--is telling. Rose is given area and board with a feminine instructor, Dr. Henshawe. Her living state of affairs conjointly arises from her passivity: "She had have to be compelled to endure Dr. Henshawe out of the blue." She enrolls in (and despises) associate degree introductory political economy course not of her own volition, however as a result of Dr. Henshawe tells her to.

Dr. Henshawe, even before St. Patrick, romanticizes Rose's poverty; she "liked poor ladies, bright ladies, however that they had to be fairly good- wanting ladies." Rose satisfies the requirements; she is, thus to talk, "working category," though "Before she came to Dr. Henshawe’s, Rose had ne'er detected of the social class." Rose's perception of her family house is altered by her stick with Dr. Henshawe:
"What Dr. Henshawe’s house and Flo’s house did best, in Rose’s opinion, was discredit one another. In Dr. Henshawe’s charming rooms there was forever for Rose the raw data of home, associate degree undigested lump, and reception currently her sense of order and modulation elsewhere exposed such embarrassing unhappy economic condition in those that ne'er thought themselves poor. economic condition wasn't simply misery, as Dr. Henshawe appeared to suppose, it had been not simply deprivation. It meant having those ugly tube lights and being happy with them. It meant continual verbalise cash and malicious point out new things individuals had bought and whether or not they were procured. It meant pride and jealousy flaring over one thing just like the new try of plastic curtains, imitating lace, that Flo had bought for the front window. That further as hanging your garments on nails behind the door and having the ability to listen to each sound from the lavatory. It meant decorating your walls with variety of admonitions, pious and cheerful and gently bawdy."
One day, within the library, an odd man touches Rose on the leg so scurries off. "It didn’t appear to her a sexual touch; it had been additional sort of a joke, tho' not in the slightest degree a friendly one." Rose does not significantly wish to try and do something regarding it, however she feels the necessity to inform somebody what happened. this can be however she involves meet St. Patrick, UN agency unintentionally is learning in an exceedingly near  carrel, and the way he involves fall soft on together with her.
"If she had been attempting to form him fall soft on together with her, there was no higher approach she may have chosen. He had several medieval notions, that he assumed to mock, by oral communication bound words and phrases as if in quotation marks. 'The honest sex,' he would say, and 'damsel in distress.'"
We area unit told quickly regarding St. Patrick that "his family was wealthy." directly thenceforth comes the subsequent passage, within which he's called poor:
He arrived early to select Rose up, once they were planning to the films. He wouldn’t knock, he knew he was early. He sat on the step outside Dr. Henshawe’s door. This was within the winter, it had been dark out, however there was somewhat coach lamp beside the door. 
“Oh, Rose! return and look!” referred to as Dr. Henshawe, in her soft, pleased voice, and that they looked down along from the dark window of the study. “The poor young man,” said Dr. Henshawe tenderly... She referred to as St. Patrick poor as a result of he was soft on, and maybe conjointly as a result of he was a male, doomed to push and mistake. Even from over here he looked stubborn and pitiable, determined and dependent, sitting out there within the cold.
Rose doesn't comprehend initially simply however wealthy St. Patrick is, and looks to look at him with a mix of pity and disgust, particularly regarding "that flinching, that lack of religion, that appeared to be discovered altogether transactions with St. Patrick." Notice the employment of the word transactions to explain their interactions. The transactional language continues within the following passage, the guts of the story:
"She couldn't flip St. Patrick down. She couldn't have intercourse. it had been not the number of cash however the number of affection he offered that she couldn't ignore; she believed that she felt compassionate him, that she had to assist him out. it had been as if he had return up to her in an exceedingly crowd carrying an oversized, simple, dazzling object — a large egg, maybe, of solid silver, one thing of uncertain use and toilsome weight — and was providing it to her, in truth thrust it at her, solicitation her to require a number of the burden of it off him. If she thrust it back, however may he bear it? however that rationalization left one thing out. It disregarded her own craving, that wasn't for wealth except for worship. The size, the weight, the shine, of what he aforesaid was love (and she failed to doubt him) had to impress her, despite the fact that she had ne'er asked for it. It failed to appear doubtless such associate degree providing would return her approach once more. St. Patrick himself, tho' worshipful, did in some oblique approach acknowledge her luck."
Whereas economists study business transactions that area unit by necessity and construction interdependent to each parties, here we have a tendency to observe human relative transactions that area unit at the best uncertain, at the worst toilsome. St. Patrick becomes the beggar, Rose the king (the object of worship); neither quite is aware of what they provide or what they receive reciprocally, nevertheless neither is absolve to decline to interact. we won't facilitate feeling that St. Patrick and Rose's "transactions" area unit as violating because the stranger's unwelcome bit of her leg.

Patrick repeatedly tells Rose however "lovely" and "charming" her economic condition has created her. He doesn't perceive her expertise of economic condition, nor she his of tremendous wealth. Then they visit every other's family homes. In preparation for her visit to Patrick's parents' house, "She had sold  additional blood and purchased a fuzzy angora sweater, peach-colored, that was very mussy and seemed like a small-town girl’s plan of dressing up. She forever complete things like that as before long as a procurement was created, not before." once she arrives,
"Size was noticeable all over and significantly thickness. Thickness of towels and rugs and handles of knives and forks, and silences. There was a terrible quantity of luxury and unease."
The trip to go to her stepparent is not any higher. Actual economic condition isn't romantic, not stunning. Afterwards, St. Patrick says, “'Your real oldsters can’t are like that.'” 
"Rose failed to like his oral communication that either, tho' it had been what she believed herself. She saw that he was attempting to produce for her a additional refined background, maybe one thing just like the homes of his poor friends: many books regarding, a tea tray, and mended linen, worn sensible taste; proud, tired, educated individuals. What a coward he was, she thought angrily, however she knew that she herself was the coward, not knowing any thanks to be snug together with her own individuals or the room or any of it. Years later she would learn the way to use it, she would be ready to amuse or intimidate right-thinking individuals at dinner parties with glimpses of her early home. At the instant she felt confusion, misery."
Despite her confusion and misery, Rose agrees to marry St. Patrick, at that purpose he offers up his plans to be an educational scholar in favor of a profitable position at his father's company (he antecedently forswore going into business.) Rose grows ever additional miserable till she finally confronts him to decision off the marriage, climatically declaring, 
"I don’t have to be compelled to grasp what i need to grasp what I don’t want!"
We believe she has eventually taken management of her own destiny. shortly when, though, she spots him in his carrel associate degreed has an "barely resistible" temptation to throw herself at him, beg his forgiveness, restore his happiness.
"It wasn't resistible, after all. She did it."
She neither is aware of her preferences nor controls her actions. we have a tendency to bear in mind however she detested her political economy category, wherever she most likely learned regarding  homo economicus, the hyper-rational, hyper-calculating representative agent with well-defined preferences. once Jane emoticon conferred writer the person agent Prize in 2009, she said, “Millions of readers obtain associate degree Alice writer story and react with a form of galvanised self-recognition.” nobody desires to acknowledge herself in homo economicus, the most character of our political economy Nobelists (with terribly delicate deviations by Shiller). We want, we have a tendency to believe we wish, to be human and distinct, romantic and idealistic. we have a tendency to acknowledge ourselves in Munro's stories, however it is not a snug recognition. Her characters are not exactly homo economicus but neither are they who we want to be. It is not so simple to separate our desires for money, love, sex, worship, power. We can see life "in economic terms" and not, as she describes at the finish of the story. the tip is told from Rose's perspective a few years later, when her 10 year wedding to St. Patrick and ultimate divorce.
"When Rose afterward reviewed and talked about this moment in her life...she said that comradely compassion had overcome her, she was not proof against the sight of a bare bent neck. Then she went any into it, and said greed, greed. She aforesaid she had run to him and clung to him and overcome his suspicions and kissed and cried and reinstated herself just because she failed to skills to try and do while not his love and his promise to seem when her; she was terrified of the {planet|the globe} and he or she had not been ready to think of the other plan for herself. once she was seeing life in economic terms, or was with those that did, she aforesaid that solely materialistic individuals had selections anyway, that if she had had the value of a ticket to provincial capital her life would are totally different. 
Nonsense, she may say later, ne'er mind that, it had been very self-importance, it had been self-importance pure and easy, to resurrect him, to bring him back his happiness. to check if she may try this. She couldn't resist such a check of power."

Robert Shiller and Radical Financial Innovation


Robert Shiller, who shares this year's Nobel Prize with Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen, is perhaps most famous for his ability to "predict the future." But he also has an impressive grasp of the past. As just one example, in my recent blog post on the history of inflation-protected securities, Shiller's paper on "The Invention of Inflation-Indexed Bonds in Early America" was the most useful reference. Shiller's ability to develop intuition from financial history has, I believe, contributed to his success in behavioral finance, or "finance from a broader social science perspective including psychology and sociology."

Rather than attempting a comprehensive overview of Shiller's work, in this post I would like to focus on "Radical Financial Innovation," which appeared as a chapter in Entrepreneurship, Innovation and the Growth Mechanism of the Free Market Economies, in Honor of William Baumol (2004).

The chapter begins with some brief but powerful observations:
According to the intertemporal capital asset model... real consumption fluctuations are perfectly correlated across all individuals in the world. This result follows since with complete risk management any fluctuations in individual endowments are completely pooled, and only world risk remains. But, in fact, real consumption changes are not very correlated across individuals. As Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) have documented, the correlation of consumption changes across countries is far from perfect…Individuals do not succeed in insuring their individual consumption risks (Cochrane 1991). Moreover, individual consumption over the lifecycle tends to track individual income over the lifecycle (Carroll and Summers 1991)... The institutions we have tend to be directed towards managing some relatively small risks."
Shiller notes that the ability to risk-share does not simply arise from thin air. Rather, the complete markets ideal of risk sharing developed by Kenneth Arrow "cannot be approached to any significant extent without an apparatus, a financial and information and marketing structure. The design of any such apparatus is far from obvious." Shiller observes that we have well-developed institutions for managing the types of risks that were historically important (like fire insurance) but not for the significant risks of today. "This gap," he writes, "reflects the slowness of invention to adapt to the changing structure of economic risks."

The designers of risk management devices face both economic and human behavioral challenges. The former include moral hazard, asymmetric information, and the continually evolving nature of risks. The latter include a variety of "human weaknesses as regards risks." These human weaknesses or psychological barriers in the way we think about and deal with risks are the subject of the behavioral finance/economics literature. Shiller and Richard Thaler direct the National Bureau of Economic Research working group on behavioral economics.

To understand some of the obstacles to risk management innovation today, Shiller looks back in history to the development of life insurance. Life insurance, he argues, was very important in past centuries when the death of parents of young children was fairly common. But today, we lack other forms of "livelihood insurance" that may be much more important in the current risk environment.
"An important milestone in the development of life insurance occurred in the 1880s when Henry Hyde of the Equitable Life Assurance Society conceived the idea of creating long-term life insurance policies with substantial cash values, and of marketing them as investments rather than as pure insurance. The concept was one of bundling, of bundling the life insurance policy together with an investment, so that no loss was immediately apparent if there was no death. This innovation was a powerful impetus to the public’s acceptance of life insurance. It changed the framing from one of losses to one of gains…It might also be noted that an educational campaign made by the life insurance industry has also enhanced public understanding of the concept of life insurance. Indeed, people can sometimes be educated out of some of the judgmental errors that Kahneman and Tversky have documented…In my book (2003) I discussed some important new forms that livelihood insurance can take in the twenty-first century, to manage risks that will be more important than death or disability in coming years. But, making such risk management happen will require the same kind of pervasive innovation that we saw with life insurance."
Shiller has also done more technical theoretical work on the most important risks to hedge:
"According to a theoretical model developed by Stefano Athanasoulis and myself, the most important risks to be hedged first can be defined in terms of the eigenvectors of the variance matrix of deviations of individual incomes from world income, that is, of the matrix whose ijth element is the covariance of individual I’s income change deviation from per capita world income change with individual j’s income change deviation from per capita world income change. Moreover, the eigenvalue corresponding to each eigenvector provides a measure of the welfare gain that can be obtained by creating the corresponding risk management vehicle. So a market designer of a limited number N of new risk management instruments would pick the eigenvectors corresponding to the highest N eigenvalues."
Based on his research, Shiller has been personally involved in the innovation of new risk management vehicles. In 1999, he and Allan Weiss obtained a patent for "macro securities," although their attempt in 1990 to develop a real estate futures market never took off.

Financing the Federal Government with Inflation-Protected Securities


In 1997, the U.S. Treasury made the contentious decision to begin issuing Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin proposed the issuance of these inflation-linked securities as a way to reduce the government's borrowing costs and increase the national saving rate, remarking:
"Helping the economy and raising incomes requires increasing productivity, and the saving rate is central to that objective. The initiative we are announcing today has the potential of raising our national saving rate as well as reducing the cost of capital to the federal government. Today we are announcing our intention to issue securities that will offer investors protection against inflation. Americans' retirement savings in their pension plans or their own IRAs can have inflation protection, which can help ensure their retirement security... 
We believe these bonds will offer savers value-added in the form of protection against inflation, plus a real rate of return backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, and in return for offering that value-added, over time the cost of financing to the federal government will be lower than it otherwise would be...This is a common sense approach to government and an excellent example of government reinvention -- protecting Americans from inflation with an innovative investment method, and saving them money as taxpayers by holding down borrowing costs."
In July 2008, however, advisers to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson recommended that Paulson should eliminate five-year TIPS and reduce the use of TIPS of other maturities, arguing that the inflation-indexed securities had cost taxpayers billions. This advice was not put into effect. The question remains: Has the Treasury benefited from issuing TIPS? I explore the mixed evidence in this post, the second in my series about inflation-indexed debt. The first post in the series, "Academic Scribblers and the History of Inflation-Protected Securities," describes  the origins and re-origins of inflation-linked government debt, which briefly appeared in 1780 and then disappeared for two centuries.

First, why might we expect TIPS to hold down borrowing costs in theory? Nominal bonds expose investors to inflation risk, so their yields presumably contain an inflation risk premium; by issuing indexed bonds, the Treasury can avoid paying the premium. John Campbell and Robert Shiller pointed out in 1996 that the magnitude--and even the sign--of the inflation risk premium was unknown. How could the inflation risk premium possibly be negative? According to the classic text on asset pricing by John Cochrane,
"All assets have an expected return equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk adjustment. Assets whose returns covary positively with consumption make consumption more volatile, and so must promise higher expected returns to induce investors to hold them. Conversely, assets that covary negatively with consumption, such as insurance, can offer expected rates of return that are lower than the risk-free rate...You might think that as asset with a volatile payoff is `risky' and thus should have a large risk correction. However, if the payoff is uncorrelated with the discount factor m, the asset receives no risk correction to its price, and pays an expected return equal to the risk-free rate!"
In short, the inflation risk premium does not depend directly on how uncertain or volatile inflation is. What matters for the inflation risk premium is how future inflation covaries with future consumption (alternatively, with the stock market), and that is not obvious. In 1996, Campbell and Shiller estimated the premium by several different methods and came up with an estimate of 50 to 100 basis points for a five-year zero-coupon nominal bond: in short, non-trivial savings for the government. These anticipated savings were part of the reason why the Treasury began issuing TIPS.

Why then, in 2008, did the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee recommend that TIPS should play a smaller role in meeting future financing needs? A member of the committee "estimates that the cumulative cost of the TIPs program to the Treasury since inception, when comparing the total expense relative to nominal bonds issued at a similar time, approaches $30 billion with the bulk of that cost a direct result of significantly higher inflation than estimated by the markets 'breakeven' level when issued." They attribute part of the cost to a liquidity cost, since TIPS are less liquid than nominals so investors must be compensated for the lower liquidity. They point out that the first factor--higher realized inflation than breakeven inflation--needn't necessarily continue. I would also point out that TIPS could gain liquidity over time as the TIPS market develops further, but the Committee's recommendation would very likely have reduced TIPS' liquidity.

An academic study in 2010 supports the view of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee. In "Why Does the Treasury Issue Tips? The Tips–Treasury Bond Puzzle,"  Matthias Fleckenstein, Francis Longstaff, and Hanno Lustig estimate that "On average, the U.S. government has to levy $2.92 more in taxes, in present discounted value, to repay $100 of debt issued if the debt is indexed rather than nominal." They add that, in issuing TIPS, the government gives up a valuable fiscal hedging option. Fleckenstein et al. say that "To the best of our knowledge, the relative mispricing of TIPS and Treasury bonds represents the largest arbitrage ever documented in the financial economics literature."

Jens Christensen and James Gillan (2011), in contrast, say that the Treasury has benefited overall from using TIPS. There are two main premiums to consider: the inflation uncertainty premium and the liquidity premium. The former can help the government lower its borrowing costs by using TIPS, and while the latter can raise its borrowing costs. Both premiums can vary over time. Christensen and Gillan attempt to quantify the size of each premium and construct a liquidity-adjusted inflation risk premium. They come up with a range of estimates, and the most conservative is plotted below. The fact that it is, on average, positive (and less conservative estimates more obviously positive) supports Treasury's continued use of TIPS. I find their results fairly convincing, particularly in light of another study
Source: Christensen and Gillan (2011)
Another study, by William C. Dudley, Jennifer Roush, and Michelle Steinberg Ezer (2009) also comes out in support of TIPS as a cost-effective form of government financing. Their estimates of the inflation risk premium by maturity of issue are in the table below. They find that the liquidity compensation was around 200 basis points in 1999 but has since fallen drastically to well below 50 basis points. The positive risk premium and low liquidity compensation in combination imply cost savings for the Treasury.
Source: Dudley, Roush, and Steinberg Ezer (2009)
In my interpretation, the balance of evidence supports the idea that TIPS are mildly cost-effective, or at least not cost-increasing, for the Treasury. The government's borrowing cost is not the only factor to consider when evaluating the net effect of TIPS. Rubin, remember, suggested that TIPS would increase the nation's saving rate and in turn increase productivity. John Campbell and Robert Shiller listed other potential upsides and downsides to TIPS in their 1996 "A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt." I'll discuss some of these other issues in future posts.

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Part 1 of series: Academic Scribblers and the History of Inflation-Protected Securities

**Disclaimer: This post not intended as investment advice.

No, Economics Is Good for Lots of Things

Survey Research at Work
Perhaps the greatest intellectual casualty of the 2008 financial crisis was the credibility of economics as a science. "Why didn't economists foresee the crisis?" people asked, and this lingering suspicion came to a head in a recent NYT editorial blasting economics as a scientific discipline. On first pass, I thought it was just one of those silly articles that crops up on occasion, but the more that I thought about the editorial, and compared it with some of the economic insights I have absorbed as a student, the more I was angered. And thus, I felt compelled to rant.

What should be kept in mind is that, like engineering, economics is a broad discipline that covers many different fields. Just as some engineers study computers and others study nuclear reactors, some economists study taxes, other study financial markets, and still others study how psychological biases should change the design of policy. So to use the chaos in financial markets as a reason to discredit all of economics is analogous to discrediting all of engineering on the count of a Fukushima disaster. While portions of macroeconomics may be made up of smoke, mirrors, and misleading standard errors, even a brief introspection can reveal why that is not representative of economics as a whole.

In economic models, people do whatever maximizes their self interest. However, this leaves no room for intellectual growth -- any new insight or strategy would have already been discovered by the omniscient agents! But people are of finite intelligence. As a result, their self-interest can be up for reinterpretation.

In this area, economists play the important role of introducing new *ideas* about policy. Precisely because people are not as omniscient as the agents in economic models, it's important that governments have a solid foundation on ideas to conceptualize and defend policies from critics. By introducing a new framework or a new empirical fact, economists can cast policy into a different light and redirect the conversation and agenda.

Let us first consider the canonical example of auction theory. Game theorists have been remarkably effective at designing auction mechanisms. The late Ronald Coase famously argued that the U.S. should auction off spectrum rights. Yet in his Congressional testimony, he was met with disbelief, with a congressman asking "is this a joke"? Later on, when the FCC changed its mind, it fell to economists (game theorists, no less!) to design the details of the auction. Designing such an auction is not a trivial task. Since it's advantageous to have radio frequencies in geographically contiguous areas, what a company is willing to bid on one spectrum in an area is dependent on whether it can win in other areas. Moreover, there are a host of protections you need to design. How do you stop firms from colluding? How do you make sure firms can't manipulate the bids to pay extremely low prices? When these issues were ignored in the Australian and New Zealand auctions, many hundreds of millions of dollars were lost.

Economists have also managed to change the way we talk about poverty policies in the United States. A common misconception is that impoverished people are just lazy, and that nothing can be done for them. And as a result, welfare just represents an unproductive transfer from the makers to the takers. However, survey data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan has shown that poverty is most often a transitory phenomenon, and that no, welfare is not about Cadillac queens or subsidizing sloth, but rather about providing insurance for a wide range of people who live on the threshold of poverty. The fact that the national conversation sometimes forgets this point is a reminder that economists do have an important role to play in shaping the welfare policy debate, and that neglecting this can have serious human impact.

And when we take a look at the the role of economists in analyzing aid and development, the impact is even larger. The foundations of international finance and the study of capital flows explains what kinds of aid are better than others, and why it's important not only to provide money but also personnel and expertise. On a micro level, pioneering experimental work, as popularized by Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banjeree in their book titled "Poor Economics", has added an additional subtlety to the design of development policy. By integrating insights from psychology and political science, development economists like them have gone on to revise how to better provide fertilizers to farmers or how to limit the extent of patronage politics. These are all critical issues in the task of economic development, and it has fallen to economists to address them.

So far, I have focused on micro topics. But there are actually a surprisingly robust set of results about how emerging markets should handle capital flows. Stephen Salant (who is teaching me applied micro modeling this fall!) laid the foundation for speculative attacks on stockpiles of resources, such as oil or food. His model later led to Krugman's pioneering work on how currency crises happen, and the lessons from the literature on currency crises showed why external debt could be so harmful for developing economies. Anton Korinek has also made great contributions outlining the welfare arguments for avoiding external debt and currency crises. Indeed, those economies who had large stocks of external debt relative to foreign reserves were precisely the ones who suffered the most during the financial crisis. While it may not be a direct result, it is now clear to all emerging markets that a combination of external debt and exchange rate pegs can be extremely dangerous. And the absence of those two fault lines has put the emerging markets on much more stable footing during the current sell-off.

Even in the controversial field of monetary policy we're doing better. Back in the 1920's, it was thought that monetary policy should ease during the boom and tighten during the bust. This was called the Real Bills Doctrine, and ended up amplifying the business cycle. Doubt about the effect of Quantitative Easing is not equivalent to ignorance about money's effect on the macroeconomy. We might not be clear on magnitudes, but we at least know which way goes up and which goes down.

From a methodological standpoint, economists are valuable because we are trained to think about social issues through a quantitative and empirical framework. While other social sciences such as sociology and psychology are also known for their increasingly quantitative measures, economists are special because the variables we are interested in -- income, prices, population -- are easily measured and interpreted quantitative measures.

(As a digression, I was surprised that this notion of economics as socially applied statistics was completely missing from the conversation about economath. Without the work in mathematical statistics, economists would have been unable to do the measurements that we do, and the empirical studies that I describe above would not have been possible. I remember Miles Kimball joking with me that empirical macro is all about interpreting measurement error, yet without the work of generations of econometricians, we would not know of how to do that kind of analysis.)

From a personal standpoint, I will also be contributing towards this kind of research this year. Since University of Michigan is a state school, we are of course very concerned about how all of our students -- across socioeconomic classes -- are doing. And therefore I will be heading a project to design a survey instrument and analysis methodology to measure how students are doing in the off campus housing markets and to identify the potential severity of this kind of socioeconomic segmentation. (See picture). While it may be true that my project will have various flaws, I still think of it as representative of the power of empirical economics. Identify problems. Collect data. Make lives better. Wash, rinse, repeat. And at least from personal experience, this mode of analysis -- of looking at bivariate relationships, of thinking about longitudinal effects -- is not as common among my fellow social scientists from psychology or political science.

This explicitly empirical tack built into modern economics is important because the alternative to a world with economists is not some non-partisan paradise. Rather, it will be filled by the Keith Olbermanns and Sean Hannities of the world, who rely instead on cheap rhetorical tricks instead of well grounded theory and empirics.

Yet in spite of my strong conviction that economists do create value for society, I do recognize that economics, on the most part, is not an experimental science. But that should not necessarily be seen as a flaw. Economists are tasked with evaluating policies that can play such a large role in the welfare of the masses. And once you know that a certain policy is harmful, it would be a profound breach of ethics to repeatedly apply such failed policy so that you could "replicate" and make the results "scientific".

I want to wrap up this post with a joke.
A physicist, a chemist and an economist are stranded on an island, with nothing to eat. A can of soup washes ashore. The physicist says, "Lets smash the can open with a rock." The chemist says, "Let’s build a fire and heat the can first." The economist says, "Lets assume that we have a can-opener..."
The punchline suggests that instead of solving problems, economists just assume them away. But the real work of economics actually comes after the initial assumption. A real economist goes "..then if we had a can opener, we would be set. So let's go make a can opener." The joke misrepresents the work of economists by focusing on "opening a can" -- a task that has neither ambiguity nor great subtlety. On these issues, of course the hard sciences will be superior. But what if we asked a different question such as "how should we reduce carbon dioxide emissions"? In this case, there is no clear answer. But the economist would go "let's assume there were a price to carbon. Then the first welfare theorem means there's no inefficiency. So let's go price carbon!"

The big social problems of our day -- long term poverty, global warming, the middle income trap -- have few direct solutions, and any solution will affect portions of society in largely differing ways. And without economists to help work out the theory and empirics, how do you plan on tackling such dilemmas?

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Update: Indeed, long term unemployment is a more severe problem than just an intellectual scruffle. But it really does seem that after the Great Recessions, economists are (perhaps rightly) viewed with more skepticism.

Low Interest Rates, Savers, and the Recovery


This is a brief addendum to my recent post, "Do Savers Need to be Saved?"

Back in March, I wrote about Paul Krugman and Charles Plosser's takes on near-zero nominal interest rates and household saving. Both noted that households were deleveraging and the zero lower bound was binding. Both agreed about Krugman's diagnosis of a "persistent shortfall in aggregate demand that can’t be cured using ordinary monetary policy." But their suggested cures were quite different.

I just came across a piece written in May by Raghuram Rajan, new Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, called "Central Bankers under Siege," that takes on the same issue. He, too, makes a similar diagnosis but suggests different cures. In my post on savers and low interest rates, I discussed the income and substitution effects of low interest rates, and mentioned that near-retirees are commonly cited as examples of people for whom the income effect dominates. Rajan actually uses this exact example:
"First, while low rates might encourage spending if credit were easy, it is not at all clear that traditional savers today would go out and spend. Think of the soon-to-retire office worker. She saved because she wanted enough money to retire. Given the terrible returns on savings since 2007, the prospect of continuing low interest rates might make her put even more money aside. 
Alternatively, low interest rates could push her (or her pension fund) to buy risky long-maturity bonds. Given that these bonds are already aggressively priced, such a move might thus set her up for a fall when interest rates eventually rise. Indeed, America may well be in the process of adding a pension crisis to the unemployment problem."
Rajan and Plosser match up point for point. Here's Plosser:
"In fact, low interest rates and fiscal stimulus spending that leads to larger government budget deficits may be designed to stimulate aggregate demand or consumption, but they could actually do the opposite. For example, low interest rates encourage households to save even more because the return on their savings is very small...
I have heard from various business contacts that the low interest rate environment is spurring institutional and individual investors to “search for yield.” This may entail taking on more credit risk than these investors are typically comfortable with in a reach for yields that may ultimately be illusive and result in losses they are ill-equipped to handle. Very low yields may also be distorting other investment decisions, inducing firms to undertake long-run investment projects that may prove to be unprofitable in a rising interest rate environment."
Both Rajan and Plosser fear that lower interest rates won't help the economy because either the income effect dominates the substitution effect or because low interest rates will cause "reaching for yield." My fellow Not Quite Noahpinion author John Aziz suggests:
"Savers looking for a larger rate of return should... take their money out of low interest savings accounts and out of the failed financial intermediation industry and invest it into quality economic projects that create jobs and growth. This could involve buying the stock or debt of large companies that wish to expand, or it could involve starting your own business, or investing in a startup or a mixture of these things. The easiest way to return to growth — and thus higher interest rates, and higher returns for things like pension funds — is for today’s savers complaining about low interest rates to turn into tomorrow’s investors seeking out and pouring money into quality projects that increase incomes, create jobs and create products that people desire and want to use."
The question is whether low interest rates have the beneficial effect on investment that Aziz describes, or the harmful reach-for-yield effect. Returning to Plosser, Krugman, and Rajan, it is interesting that the three economists seem to diagnose what is ailing the economy quite similarly (a "persistent shortfall in aggregate demand that can’t be cured using ordinary monetary policy"), but make different prescriptions. First, they differ in their opinions of unconventional monetary policy:
  • Plosser: "The first step is to wind down our asset purchases by the end of the year in a gradual and predictable manner. As I said, I see little if any benefit from these purchases, and growing costs. The second step is for the FOMC to commit to its forward guidance on the fed funds rate path, that is, to begin treating the 6.5 percent unemployment rate and the 2.5 percent inflation rate in the guidance as triggers rather than thresholds."
  • Krugman: "Unconventional monetary policy is both controversial and an iffy proposition (which doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be tried)."
  • Rajan: "We really don’t know. Given the dubious benefits of still lower real interest rates, placing central-bank credibility at risk would be irresponsible."
They also differ in their general policy prescriptions:
  • Plosser wants removal of fiscal-policy-induced uncertainty: "There remains significant uncertainty about the choices that will be made. How much will tax rates rise? How much will government spending be cut? U.S. fiscal policy is clearly on an unsustainable path that must be corrected. Efforts by Congress and the administration at the end of last year reduced some of the near-term uncertainty over personal tax rates. But the impact of the sequester, the debate over the continuing resolution to fund the federal government beyond this month, and the debt ceiling, which will once again become binding in the spring, all have clouded the fiscal policy situation. So, the resultant uncertainty will likely be a drag on near-term growth. In my view, until uncertainty has been resolved, monetary policy accommodation that lowers interest rates is unlikely to stimulate firms to hire and invest."
  • Krugman thinks the fiscal multiplier is large, and fiscal retrenchment would be destructive: "the logic for a biggish multiplier and the logic of the crisis itself are very closely linked: times like these, the aftermath of a credit bubble, are precisely when you expect fiscal multipliers to be large. And that in turn says, once again, that fatalism — or worse yet, demands for fiscal retrenchment — in the aftermath of such a bubble are deeply destructive."
  • Rajan looks to helping households refinance, and (somehow) improving workforce capabilities: "We cannot ignore high unemployment. Clearly, improving indebted households’ ability to refinance at low current interest rates could help to reduce their debt burden, as would writing off some mortgage debt in cases where falling house prices have left borrowers deep underwater (that is, the outstanding mortgage exceeds the house’s value)... But it is also important to recognize that the path to a sustainable recovery does not lie in restoring irresponsible and unaffordable pre-crisis spending, which had the collateral effect of creating unsustainable jobs in construction and finance... Sensible policy lies in improving the capabilities of the workforce across the country, so that they can get sustainable jobs with steady incomes."

Four Ways to Answer Economics Questions


I recently came across a saying about the four ways of answering questions according to the Pañha Sutta.
  1. There are questions that should be answered categorically [straightforwardly yes, no, this, that].
  2. There are questions that should be answered with an analytical answer, defining or redefining the terms. 
  3. There are questions that should be answered with a counter-question. 
  4. There are questions that should be put aside.
A lot of the questions that economists get asked a lot can be answered in all four ways. I thought it would be fun to play a little "Economics Q&4A." I'll provide a few examples. If you wish, chime in with your own Q&4As in the comments.

Q: Is economics a science?
  1. Yes.
  2. This depends on exactly how you define science and what you consider to be the bounds and scope of economics. For the most part, economists cannot do controlled laboratory experiments. You can see lots of people's opinions on this question here, and you can read Mark Thoma and Paul Krugman here.
  3. Does this really matter? If it were not a science, should we stop trying to do it?
  4. **goes back to work**
Q: Is all this quantitative easing going to cause an inflation problem?
  1. No.
  2. You are probably asking about the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policies. For an explanation of why they haven't (and probably won't) cause problematically high inflation, see these posts.
  3. What do you mean by inflation problem? Isn't it possible that a bit more inflation would be a good thing? Do you see any signs of an inflation problem? Don't we have bigger problems than inflation?
  4. **sighs**
Q: If households have to tighten their belts, shouldn't the government?
  1. No.
  2. By belt-tightening, I presume you mean reducing the deficit of the federal government. You might have heard President Obama say, in 2010, "Small businesses and families are tightening their belts. Their government should too." But households are different than the government. You can read some bloggers' reactions here and here.
  3. Is the government a household?
  4. **slumps**
Q: How should I invest my money?
  1. Wisely.
  2. This depends on your situation and your financial goals. I don't know of any guaranteed get-rich-quick investment schemes. You should probably try to diversify, and not keep all your money under your mattress or in gold. I'm also not an investment adviser, just a young academic economist with no experience, so I'm horribly underqualified to help you with this.
  3. How much money do you have? And what are your investment goals? And why are you asking an economics grad student?
  4. **shrugs wildly**
Q: Should we go back on the gold standard?
  1. No.
  2. Here is an excerpt from Barry Eichengreen's answer
"Envisioning a statute requiring the Federal Reserve to redeem its notes for fixed amounts of specie is easy, but deciding what that fixed amount should be is hard. Set the price too high and there will be large amounts of gold-backed currency chasing limited supplies of goods and services. The new gold standard will then become an engine of precisely the inflation that its proponents abhor. But set the price too low, and the result will be deflation, which is not exactly a healthy state for an economy...The distributional effects of deflation are no happier than those of inflation.... The populist revolt of the 1880s was stoked by farmers with fixed mortgages who labored under growing debt burdens and financial distress as a result of falling crop prices. Nor is deflation likely to support robust economic growth, as any close observer of the Japanese economy will tell you.... 
And even if we are lucky enough to get it right at the outset, consider what happens subsequently. As the economy grows, the price level will have to fall. The same amount of gold-backed currency has to support a growing volume of transactions, something it can do only if the prices are lower, unless the supply of new gold by the mining industry magically rises at the same rate as the output of other goods and services. If not, prices go down, and real interest rates become higher. Investment becomes more expensive, rendering job creation more difficult all over again. Under a true gold standard, moreover, the Fed would have little ability to act as a lender of last resort to the banking and financial system...Its proponents paint the gold standard as a guarantee of financial stability; in practice, it would be precisely the opposite." 
3. What have you learned from history?
4. **cowers**

Q: When is Noah coming back?
  1. In about 3 months.
  2. If you mean coming back to the blog, that will be in about 3 months. However, he has never left Twitter. If you mean coming back to the United States, I think that already happened. 
  3. What, don't you like us?
  4. **checks watch**
Your turn!

Rise of the machine-owners















In recent years, more and more credence has been given to the scary notion of "skill-biased technological change" - the idea that technology is no longer usable by everyone, and so is causing an increase in inequality. Basically, the theory says that thinking machines have begun to replace some of us, but not yet all of us; those who own the thinking machines (capitalists) and those who are smart enough to operate them (tech workers) will get more and more of what our automated society produces. I'm not convinced this theory describes our current world, but it certainly seems like it
could happen sometime, as computers get smarter but human capabilities don't improve. What do we do if 70% or 80% of humanity becomes no more employable than dogs?

Matt Yglesias suggests that the rich people make the poor people their pets:
One way to think about the skill-biased technological change issue that I think is useful is to construct for yourself an exaggerated hypothetical in which SBTC is definitely driving a big increase in inequality...what would be the correct policy response? I say—higher taxes to finance more and better public services, the exact same thing that’s the correct policy response to the actual world.
Note that he's not exactly saying that rich people should give their wealth to the poor. He's saying that rich people should give their wealth to an organization that provides services for the poor. In Yglesias' ideal world, not only will the poor depend on the (willing or forced) largesse of the rich for their daily bread, but they won't get to decide how to spend that bread; instead, they will live in a playground that is crafted and shaped for them by others, receiving their livelihood indirectly in the form of "public services."

In other words, they will be pets.

Why do humans keep pets? Because the pets are cute, lovable, companionable, etc., which is just another way of saying
because we like them. We pay pets to live in a world that we prepare and create for them, simply because it makes us feel good to do so. Yglesias' solution to skill-biased technological change is to do the same for obsolete human beings.

This sounds nightmarish. But in fact there is no easy solution to the problem of SBTC, as the most obvious alternative - simply ban the technology that makes humans obsolete - is utterly unworkable in practice. What are we to do, then? Will the rise of thinking-machines inevitably force us to choose between "pet-owner socialism" and "ditch-digger socialism"?

It is my opinion that the only acceptable, workable long-term solution to the SBTC problem is to use society's resources to focus on inventing technologies that augment human capabilities - things like intelligence enhancement and cyborg modification for human-machine interface. Furthermore, we should use the government to redistribute not wealth, but inborn capability (much as we try to do now with public education), making sure that things like heightened intelligence and human-machine interface are available equally to even the poorest citizens. In other words, we must battle skill-biased technology by creating and disseminating skill-boosting technology.

I know that sounds really weird, but isn't that better than having a society that's divided between those who own and operate thinking-machines, and those who live as pets for the former? Someday, this will be the choice we face.
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